After twenty years on the throne, Mohammed VI, and the Moroccan monarchy, are no longer immune from societal reproach. The Arab uprisings’ February 20th movement and subsequent social protests have managed to lift the veil of fear and to demystify the monarchy. These protests have led to the decentralization of social protests, moving from urban centers to peripheral regions in Morocco sharing common political and economic grievances, often triggered by accidental events. The Hirak protests, the ongoing seven-year old protests in the remote Amazigh village of Imider, the coal mine protests in the northeastern border town of Jerada, the water shortage demonstrations in the Sahara desert town of Zagora, and the unprecedented economic boycott of Morocco’s dairy, mineral water, and fuel distribution oligopolies that have close ties to the regime are all acts of civil dissent which have become quotidian performances of resistance against “hogra” that is seen as rampant in the Makhzen’s entrenched authoritarian edifice. These “Non-Movements” of peripheral protests in various regions of Morocco are rarely guided by an ideology or led by recognizable leaderships and structures, and have, most importantly, unmasked a new kind of dilemma for the monarchy: the failure of the regime’s dual strategy of appearing above the political fray, while at the same time, managing the political system and opposition forces. The monarchy’s constant manipulation of the political party scene and civil society has removed the buffer between the royal institution and the people, and has exposed the Palace to direct scrutiny. The monarchy’s increasing incapacity to constructively deal with social unrest has made it more prone to the use of old oppressive methods of control.