This study applies the Hirschman model of “Exit, voice and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970) to the case of emigration in Algeria since the end of 1990’s civil war. It looks at specifically one form of emigration; el-harga. Literally translated harga is a burn. In the Maghreb, the term is associated with illegal migration. Harragas are the Maghrebians, mainly young men, who try to leave their home country illegally on small boats, facing high risks. Looking at the causes of el-harga, one has to go beyond the platitudes about the attractiveness of a Western el-dorado. Indeed I revealed that Algerian emigration is a real flight, with very little concern for the country of arrival. It is an “exit” for people who feel despised and abused by their own government. What are the political implications of el-harga ? What mechanisms link “exit” and “voice”? Does the “exit” option (emigration) undermine “voice” (public protest and riots) as originally argued by Hirschman? This paper combines theoretical consideration with empirical insight from Algerian migration. Indeed it is based on a 6-month fieldwork in Algeria monitoring illegal departures and public protests. I mainly conducted semi-directive interviews with migrants and protesters. This study also involved collection, compilation and analysis of newspaper articles, political speeches as well as legislative and other regulatory documents dealing with harga and public protests. I argue that examining el-harga and its political implication requires a reconfiguration of the “exit, voice and loyalty” model. “Exit” and “voice” are not mutually exclusive alternatives. Even if the availability of an exit option, through harga, drains forces form public protests in Algeria, this form of exit because it is highly risky and receives a lot of media and political attention can be analyzed as a form of “Voice through Exit”.