The paper presents a brief historical background to the management of Iraq’s economy prior to the invasion of 2003. It then analyses the reconstruction policy following the invasion and underlines the reasons for the failure of US economic policy in Iraq. The paper highlights the economic achievements in those six years and looks at the economic obstacles facing the country. Inter-related issues such as the brain drain and the pervasive corruption will be discussed. Both those issues affected the management of Iraq’s economy: the emigration of professionals has constrained the ability of the civil service to plan and execute the policies needed for the revival of the economy, while corruption meant the loss of significant assets and poor allocation of resources. The paper addresses the questions of whether Iraq’s economy can change from being dependent on oil revenues and how it would cope if oil prices were to stay low in the $40-50 range. The paper is based on published information, mostly from US and Iraqi sources and the numerous reports of US government and international organizations. Utilizing the published statistics and data, a picture is drawn of Iraq’s economy, and in certain instances, comparisons are made to other Arab countries or countries post-conflict.