According to most measures of political freedom, the Middle East is the least free region in the world. Within the Middle East, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council stand out as enduring dynastic monarchies with very limited opportunities for political expression. Yet even within these monarchical authoritarian regimes, there is considerable variation in the degree of institutionalized political feedback provided to country rulers. Political feedback is provided not just through elected assemblies, but also through structured consultative councils. What accounts for the variation in levels of institutionalized public feedback, ranging from high (Kuwait), medium (Bahrain, Qatar), to low (UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia)? In these non-democracies, why do some rulers consistently get reliable information about public preferences, while others do not? In this paper I argue that some Gulf monarchs demonstrate higher levels of vertical accountability to their citizens through robust consultative processes as a result of three factors: 1) historical patterns of regime consolidation and the social contract around citizen rights that emerged at the time of independence, 2) levels of domestic tribal and religious pluralism, and 3) size of the native population. In general, the more citizen rights were negotiated with the ruling family at the time of independence, the higher the level of domestic pluralism, and the smaller the size of the native population, the more likely rulers are to respect the political rights of their citizens through processes of public consultation. Evidence for the argument is provided from historical and ethnographic sources, as well as media content analysis.