The Arab spring, and in particular the rapid fall of Tunisian President Ben Ali, surprised and worried Morocco’s monarchy. Especially given that the ruling RCD party and the methods of state management in neighboring Tunisia were considered models by Moroccans close to the palace. The Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM, founded by close personal friends of the King in late 2008 and which won 2009 municipal elections) drew heavily on the RCD’s discourse and secularist vision. Most of Morocco’s political parties, the administration and the media were mobilized by the regime in January 2011 to prevent the spread of the revolutionary contagion to Morocco. The call for protest in Morocco posted on YouTube and then replicated by hundreds of young people on social networks triggered a strong reaction from the state and independent media close to power, which attacked movement organizers and stigmatized them as immoral traitors. The pressure of the state was so intense that the moderate Islamist PJD party opted not to participate in the demonstrations. However, the popular success of the first February 20 event changed everything; the government decided to respond positively, including proposing constitutional and political reforms. The PJD would be perceived by the regime as an unexpected “savior.” Revolutions and upheaval in neighboring countries deeply affected the King’s close aides and advisors. El Himma, for example, resigned from his position as leader of the PAM. The regime transitioned into full crisis mode. The King appointed an advisory committee for constitutional revision, which completed its work in record time under intense pressure from street protest. In July 2011, a referendum was held for the adoption of the constitution, after which tensions began to fall in the country and protests became less massive. Early parliamentary elections gave power to the PJD, a party previously considered “recalcitrant” by the monarchy. This paper will focus its analysis at first on the semi-conflictual, semi-collaborative relationship between the PJD and the monarchy. The second part deals with the consequences of the election of an Islamist-led government bent on exercising “real” power within a Moroccan political framework and the makhzenian habitus. The paper will also attempt to answer the question as to whether this experiment will lead to a parliamentary monarchy. The paper is based on extensive fieldwork in situ in Morocco, including interviews with all of the key political stakeholders.