Is there a normative proscription against military coups? A consensus in the civil-military relations literature holds that soldiers lack the necessary legitimacy to step into a political role. This study intervenes in that conversation to ask two broad questions. First, does any political agent, soldier or civilian, possess the requisite social and/or political capital to perform an armed takeover? Second, beyond levels of legitimacy, can we more precisely conceptualize the normative environment in which the politics of the coup d'état operate? This essay argues that if a coup taboo exists, then conspirators will adhere to the norm even when they are its transgressors. The paper examines three “coup environments”—in which public discourse surrounding the use of coups becomes activated—in three coup-prone states: Tunisia, 2013; Egypt, 2013; and Turkey, 2016. The coup taboo helps observers of Middle East affairs better understand why the region's politicians and soldiers have denounced coups and labeled theirs revolutions, since as far back as the Young Turks.