The concept paper for our panel, written by Loewe, et.al., puts forward an insightful framework for conceptualizing the drivers of change in a social contract. This paper applies the Loewe, et.al. framework to the Egyptian case from 2011 to the present. The paper begins by briefly summarizing the major changes to Egypt’s social contract since 2011. It then considers the degree to which the Loewe et.al. framework can explain these changes. It finds that the Loewe, et.al. framework could be strengthened by further exploring the following drivers of change: - balance of power within the state. In the Egyptian case, a longstanding de facto contract between the Presidency and the military collapsed in 2011. The new contract that emerged after 2013 altered the elite coalition that underlay the regime and led to change in the social contract; - structure of the labor market. The regime faced a labor market that was divided into core insiders (the military and military-related firms), legacy insiders (state workers in the civil service and the public sector), and outsiders (in the informal sector). It revised the social contract in a manner that directed substantial support to core insiders while reducing support to legacy insiders. Outsiders in the informal sector were left with little or no support. - new technologies of repression that enable the regime to monitor society more extensively, target repression more effectively, and shape the public sphere in a manner supportive of the new social contract; - international sponsors. The Gulf states and China emerged as new sources of financial and military assistance. They legitimated and funded the new social contract and the institutions that support it. The paper further concludes that de facto contracts between parts of the state and between state actors and foreign sponsors can exercise decisive influence over the composition and durability of a social contract. Furthermore, the most likely driver of future modifications to the social contract is change in the distribution of power within the military or between the military and the internal security apparatus. Any sustained modification of the social contract will also require an external sponsor who will underwrite at least some of the cost.