Iraqi-Sudanese relations provide an interesting case study for examining the effects of Saddam Hussein’s al-hamla al-Imaniyya (“faith campaign”) in Iraq’s foreign relations. This paper argues that irrespective of the sincerity of the Iraqi Ba’th regime’s shift toward greater religiosity starting in the mid-1980s, which culminated in the Islamization program during the 1990s, the shift resulted in distinct consequences in Iraq’s foreign affairs, in addition to the more apparent domestic policies. Close relations with Sudan were an important strategic asset for the Iraqi Ba’th regime of Saddam Hussein between 1979 and 2003. This relationship was transformed due to Iraq’s international isolation under UN sanctions following the 1991 Gulf War, yet remained a crucial link in the regime’s foreign policy until its end. Shortly after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Leader Hassan al-Turabi urged Saddam Hussein to publicly embrace Islam in a private meeting between the two leaders. When Saddam subsequently launched his “faith campaign,” the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and several Sudanese factions enthusiastically embraced the shift and in so doing became important allies of the regime. The paper suggests that the most overt consequence in foreign affairs was the presence of Sudanese and other foreign volunteers in the ranks of the regime’s most committed defenders as they faced the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Claims of Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation with al-Qaeda and Iran were crucial to the Clinton administration’s justification for its 1998 missile strike against a Sudanese factory alleged to have been producing biological weapons, yet the sources examined in this paper present a different, albeit complex picture. Drawing on captured Iraqi records in the form of written documents and audio recordings held at the National Defense University’s Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) and Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, along with U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, this paper concludes that the Iraqi-Sudanese relationship did not contain the degree of overt military cooperation U.S. government and intelligence officials believed at the time, yet in other respects, was more complex and consequential than they realized. The research presented in this paper in turn poses many questions about the evolution of Iraq’s foreign relations more broadly, the nature of cooperation between states under international isolation, and the impact of sanctions in terms of moving official bilateral relations underground with the increased reliance on forming alliances with semi-state and non-state actors.