Under what conditions would elites distribute public goods to neighborhoods where the residents have collaborated with Daesh? How does variation in the attributes of a neighborhood (e.g. class, religion, partisanship or co-ethnicity) and collaboration status affect the prospects for disbursement of public good? Through a survey of 400 politicians, we assess preferences for allocating public good using a forced choice conjoint experiment design (Hainmueller et al., 2013). The experiment randomly varied the identity of a hypothetical neighborhood in [province/district/subdistrict] and the collaboration status. The respondent indicated whether they were likely to allocate the public good to the neighborhood. We find that elites are less willing to allocate public good to neighborhoods with high levels of collaboration. Elites primarily motivated by self-interest and take actions to enhance their electoral prospects. Given that public goods funds are limited, elites will use a strategic decision-making process when it comes to the allocation of these goods. Furthermore, elites wish to allocate goods to groups that help their reputation rather than harm it. Publicly allocating goods to individuals perceived as collaborators is expensive since it risks damaging their reputation with their main constituency and other politicians. The results of these experiments fill a critical gap in the existing literature on reintegration and social cohesion in post-conflict settings. Previous research has used survey data to evaluate the conditions under which civilians forgive civilians who have collaborated (Kao and Revkin 2021) but does not explore the determinants of social trust between elites and civilians. Other work has used evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments to measure the effects of civil war-related violence on pro-social behaviors including altruistic giving, public goods contributions, and trust-based transactions (Gilligan et al., 2014), but does not examine the effects of civilian collaboration with the insurgency on these outcomes. Other studies use data on ex-combatants to identify individual-level predictors of successful demobilization and reintegration (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Annan et al., 2011), but do not systematically examine elite attitudes toward former combatants.This study will be the first to examine two important issues: 1) whether politicians hold a bias against those who are perceived to have collaborated with Daesh; and whether other attributes of neighborhoods influence a politician to be more likely to distribute public goods to neighborhoods in which collaborators live in.