Drawing upon interviews and primary and secondary source research in Turkey and Azerbaijan, and employing a comparative political science approach, this paper asks: Why have Black Sea countries already dealing with the effects of climate change (extreme weather events, sea level fluctuation, etc.) largely opted for mitigation strategies (reduction of GHG emissions) rather than adaptation strategies? While adaptation responds to immediate risks and in many cases has greater utility to local constituents, countries experiencing direct effects of extreme weather events often puzzlingly choose policies which prioritize mitigation. This is the case even though the effects of mitigation will be experienced globally and at a much later time, and mitigation strategies often require investment in new technologies and the creation of new market structures to make renewable energy and energy efficiency projects economically viable. Others who have tried to answer this question have focused on technological and market/regulatory framework explanations and the relative economic prosperity of a country. Yet none of these approaches are able to fully answer the question of why some countries still don't pursue adaptation even when they should from a human and energy security standpoint. Recent research has observed that the diffusion of environmental programs is simultaneously influenced by processes operating within nested organizational fields at local, national, and global levels. Similarly, I argue that explaining why countries pursue mitigation over adaptation requires examining how constellations of forces at different levels come together on the ground. Though my dissertation draws on case studies throughout the broader Black Sea region, this paper will discuss my case studies of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan, despite its hydrocarbon resources and the fact that it is already bearing the economic and social costs of flooding, sea level fluctuation in the Caspian, and damage to agriculture from higher temperatures, has chosen to pursue aggressive GHG mitigation policies rather than adaptation. Turkey has recently embarked on limited adaptation in southeastern Turkey, largely galvanized by international donor organizations, yet its domestic policies also mostly focus on mitigation. I explain how domestic private sector interests in renewable energy, involvement in international climate negotiations, the international donor community’s local agendas, and the relative social and political capital of communities affected by climate change shape these countries’ respective approaches to domestic climate change mitigation and adaptation. I use these examples to draw broader conclusions for shaping regional approaches to climate change and energy security in the Middle East.