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Bribes and Judges: Results from an Original Survey on Citizen Perceptions of Judicial Corruption in Morocco
Abstract
Under what conditions do citizens view judges as bribe-taking and corrupt, or, conversely, as irreproachable and honest? How much, moreover, do these raise or lower citizens’ overall levels of trust in judges, specifically, and in the court system, more generally? Analyzing an original survey of 1200 respondents from the Middle East and North Africa completed in January 2015, this paper examines this topic. Specifically, the survey of Moroccan respondents indicates that approximately 76 percent of citizens believe that litigants get judicial decisions ruled in their favor by the paying of bribes to judges. Yet, citizen beliefs about the importance of bribe-taking to getting favorable judicial rulings varied considerably according to the socio-economic and cultural attributes of respondents. In general, citizens with less political sophistication—with less access to information and economic resources—were more likely to view judges as corrupt bribe-takers. These included citizens with low levels of education and wealth, those who lived in poor communities, and those who were of ethnic minority backgrounds. By contrast, citizens with greater political sophistication—especially those working in the business sector—undervalued the influence of bribes on judges’ rulings. Because businessmen and other private sector employees are often targets of bribe solicitation in the developing world, these results are counterintuitive and suggest that citizens’ perceptions of the prevalence of corruption among judges may in fact exceed the empirical reality. This paper concludes by showing how citizen belief in the centrality of bribe-taking to receiving favorable rulings from judges undermines diffuse trust in both judges and the court system, respectively. This finding confirms research from the U.S. context, which suggests that an absence of citizen trust in judges and the courts hinders the effectiveness of the judicial branch.
Discipline
Political Science
Geographic Area
None
Sub Area
None