There is no question that Kurdistan Regional Government former President Massoud Barzani's decision to hold a referendum on independence on September 25, 2017, turned out very badly for the Iraqi Kurds. The aftermath of the referendum saw regional powers united against them while no allies, including the United States, came to their defense. The Kurdish front also fell prey to internal divisions, resulting in a retreat from disputed areas held by the Kurds and their repossession by Baghdad. Critics of the Barzanis present the referendum move as a move destructive to the Kurdish national interest, aimed at shoring up Mr. Barzani's political legitimacy rather than achieving anything for the Kurdish nation in Iraq. This paper assesses the strategic rationality of the referendum move, attempting to judge it not by the results (given that any risky move in international relations can turn out well or badly), but rather by the standard of information available to KRG decision makers prior to Sept.25 and the "national interest" of Kurds in Iraq.