I argue that the institutionalization of military leaders as bureaucratic elites in Egypt prevented a successful and immediate transfer of power following widespread popular uprisings in early 2011. The paper attempts to bridge a gap in the literature in which the institutionalization of the military and its effects on moments of transitions has been overlooked, using Egypt as a unique and informative case study. The literature on revolutions suggests that one of the most crucial components of a successful revolution is the moment of military defection; when the military ceases to use violence or the threat of violence to defend or support the old regime, enabling the emergence of a new center of sovereignty to take power. However, the pivotal moment in February when the Egyptian military decided not to fire on protesters did not permit a new center of sovereignty to materialize. Instead, the Egyptian military essentially defected to itself, maintaining not only a traditional coercive role but also expanding its role as a major bureaucratic entity with extensive political and economic powers. The paper begins with a brief history of the military in Egyptian politics since the establishment of the republic in 1952, focusing on the period of increasing professionalization and bureaucratization of the military under former President Hosni Mubarak and outlining the military’s control and ownership of important sectors of the Egyptian economy. I then discuss literature on revolutions, the structure and role of the military in post-colonial and developing countries (with a particular focus on a small but growing literature focusing on militaries in the Middle East), and the role of elites in moments of political transition to provide a framework for conceptualizing Egypt’s revolutionary moment. When read together, these literatures provide important insights on how institutionalization of the military’s coercive and bureaucratic roles prevented a successful transition of power in Egypt. I conclude with implications regarding Egyptian and regional politics. Egypt provides an interesting example of how preexisting military, bureaucratic, and elite structures have influenced the outcome of a revolutionary moment, and how these institutions have remained largely unaffected by superficial shifts of political power. I also offer suggestions for how my framework can be used to explore recent political turmoil in Libya, Tunisia, and Syria, where different configurations of military institutionalization have resulted in varying levels of revolutionary success.