This paper explores the impact of neo-liberal economic policies on the military institution in Egypt before and after the 2011 uprisings. It investigates how the Egyptian military created a vast economic empire in Mubarak’s neo-liberal milieu. Then it investigates how the new wave of economic openness, adopted by the Muslim Brothers’ regime, will affect the military’s engagement in the post-revolutionary economy. It argues that the businesses of a formerly socialist army in Egypt flourished in the market environment that Mubarak’s authoritarian regime created in the two decades that preceded the uprisings. After the rise of the Muslim Brothers to power, the Islamist version of market has formed a delicate alliance with the military, where in many cases the bearded capital collaborates and in others collides with the armed capital. Mubarak’s autocracy started to liberalize the economy in 1992, and his son Gamal accelerated the process from 2004 until 2011. During these particular years, the Egyptian army became heavily involved in creating its own enterprises of civilian production and services— including factories, companies, farms, gas stations, and more. Mubarak issued numerous legal codes to privilege the military-owned businesses, with its low-quality products compared to those of private business tycoons, within the national market. The Ministry of Defense’s enterprises were above budget supervision in the parliament, did not pay taxes and tariffs, used conscripts as forced labor, and were immune to privatization. On the eve of the 2011 uprisings and immediately after them while in full power over the state, the Egyptian military expanded its investments in many strategic sectors, such as steel, cement, energy, trade, food production, and more. As the government of the Muslim Brothers has started a new era of neo-liberalism in Egypt, applying for a loan from the IMF and inviting Gulf and international capital to the country, the fate of the military enterprises remains vague. This paper argues that the Muslim Brothers will leave most of the generals’ businesses intact, in order to appease the military institution and maintain the delicate alliance with it. Article No. 197 of the Muslim Brothers’ new constitution already keeps the military budget above public oversight. However, Muslim Brothers’ capitalists are entering into a fierce competition with military capital in large strategic sectors— especially steel and cement—which might negatively affect the less competitive enterprises of the generals. This also might hurt the alliance and shake the post-revolutionary political order.