With the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world, despite political liberalization in much of the region in the 1990s, scholars have shifted their analytical lens from examining the prospects of democratization to the reasons for democracy's failure and finally to the reasons for authoritarianism's success in the region (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). The conditions under which authoritarian regimes persist, how they adapt, and the mechanisms they use to maintain control increasingly are the subjects of debate. However, the literature on strategies of state control deals almost exclusively at the national level (Lust-Okar 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 2006; Bank 2004; Bank and Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2004, 2007; Albrecht 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) with little research available on the municipal level (Tajbakhsh, 2000; Baylouny 2005). This paper questions the role municipal governments play as instruments of authoritarian state control. Based on fieldwork conducted in Jordan, this paper argues that municipal governments act as instruments of state control through three primary means. The first is the de-politicization of municipal politics through changes to the laws (1955 and 2007) that govern municipalities. Legal amendments have restricted the scope of municipal responsibilities, and, as a result, have confined the role of municipal governments to service provision. Without any significant legislative or governance role, municipal governments provide a weak base for political parties or potential opposition leadership. The second is the appointment of pro-regime figures to municipal governments by the central government and/or the approval by the central government of appointments of regime-loyal figures at the municipal level by regime-loyal mayors. The result is a municipal government over which reform-minded mayors have little authority. The third form of state control is via municipalities' local development projects. Responding to the central government's call for municipalities to generate their own revenues, municipalities are engaging in public-private investment projects. Fieldwork indicates that these projects provide another means through which regime-loyal figures, in the form of investors, are strengthened. Significantly, the role of municipalities as service providers and, consequently, as instruments of state control is being indirectly entrenched by foreign donor programmes engaged in local development projects. This process will deepen with the implementation of Jordan's decentralization law which strengthens municipalities' service and income-generation roles. Interviews for this paper were conducted in municipalities throughout Jordan. In-depth case studies were conducted in eight municipalities engaged in public-private investment projects.