Discussions about political economy in the Arab world before the Arab spring emphasized theorizing the democratic deficit and the apparent stability of authoritarian regimes. In explaining these, both the direct as well as the indirect effects of oil on the region’s political economy featured prominently. The regime fragility that has been in evidence since the start of the Arab spring in late 2010 has been attributed, interestingly, to various economic sources too. These range from the inability of the Arab economies to provide adequate employment and increasing income inequality to rises in the price of food. These analyses thus assumed that Arab economies were somehow economically distressed. Indeed, the (mostly economic) explanations offered for the recent social revolutions in the Arab world have been so widespread that it is difficult (if they are to be believed) to see how revolution was avoided for so long, a notable reversal of the previously held doctrine regarding regime stability. The extent to which Arab economies were distressed is the central issue of this paper. Thus, the poverty rates, food prices, rates of unemployment (including when available educated and youth), income inequality, and wages and salaries of select MENA economies are examined. The purpose is 1) to understand how (if at all) these economies were distressed and 2) to learn whether the economies that were most distressed were the ones that experienced revolts. The findings cast doubt on the existence of a strong and direct association between economic hardship and social protest, so readily assumed by some analysts. The results suggest that such a relationship is far more tenuous and contingent. Nevertheless, the weak correspondence between economic distress and political revolt is consistent with the research of social revolts elsewhere in the Middle East, notably the Iranian revolution of 1978-9.