After experiencing apparent national cohesion during the uprising, numerous tensions emerged within Tunisian society. The success of an-Nahda and the appearance of Salafist militants have raised basic questions, such as the nature of Tunisian identity. The previous consensus on a reformist heritage (Hibou 2006) weakened. While social order was formerly guaranteed by a combination of cooptation, paternalistic redistribution of resources, and oppressive methods, physical confrontations occurred occasionally after the collapse of the regime. The fall of President Ben Ali has in fact swept away the usual means of regulating social conflicts (Harling 2012). Even in the absence of ethnic and religious minorities, the political transition features rising polarizations. Heated debates and persistent demonstrations reveal opposing factions on the ground: Islamists vs. secularists, Arabic-speakers vs. French-speakers, centre vs. periphery (or coast vs. inland, cities vs. countryside). History is often evoked as a legitimizing reference. These antagonisms mirror a gap between a Western-educated elite and the mass ascribable to the modern era and colonial legacies. Similar tendencies manifested themselves within the Tunisian national movement, when the “pragmatic, moderate and progressive” Habib Bourguiba, native of the Sahel, was countered by the radical Salah Ben Youssef from Djerba who adopted Islamic and Arab identity as rallying cries. The paper aims to analyze in a historical perspective the above territorial and cultural cleavages. The party system is a privileged source of analysis as it reflects the conflict-integration dynamic (Lipset, Rokkan 1990). Thus special attention will be paid to the 2011 electoral competition and the governmental coalition (an-Nahda–Congress for the Republic Party–Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties). An attempt to address all the country through a nationwide network is combined, in al-Nahda’s approach, with an emphasis on morality and religion. The other parties have instead local bases, especially in the capital (the Left) or the peripheral Western region (Al-Aridha whose leader is from Sidi Bouzid). The online press will be also taken into account in order to monitor the different stances. Citizens and intellectuals in particular, in their new role of watchdogs, voice increasingly their opinions and grievances. Discussions over the Family Code of 1956, religious behaviour in public space (i.e. the niq?b at the university) and the place of Arabic language are particularly significant.