The past four decades have witnessed the rise of political Islam across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Islamist regimes have emerged in Iran and Sudan, Islamist governments were voted into power in Turkey and Tunisia, and political Islamist parties have strengthened in Jordan and Morocco (Milton-Edwards, 2004; Mandaville, 2007; Ayoob, 2008). Consequently, much interest has been taken on the impact of Islamism on a number of domestic and international issues including minority group treatment (Esposito and Piscatori, 1991; Appleby, 2000; Stepan and Robinson, 2003). This project focuses on the intersection between Islamism and minority treatment. The question on the juncture of political Islam and ethnic and religious pluralism has been at the center of academic and policy spheres since the inception of Islamist movements in the region. Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy stated that minority treatment remained a "grey zone" for Islamists highlighting the ambiguity surrounding the issue (2009). To illuminate the phenomenon, this study employs a comparative methodology analyzing minority groups under three Islamist governments: Turkey's Justice and Development Party (2002-2014), Al-Bashir's Sudan (1989-2014), and post-revolutionary Iran (1979-2014). The cases are selected on the bases of the Most Different System Design in which different variables lead to a similar outcome. While the three states are culturally, institutionally, and economically distinct, they all share a non-static and changing approach in minority treatment. Document analysis and field research in Sudan and Turkey have shown that governments influenced by Islamist ideology do not follow a fixed approach towards their ethnic and religious minorities. The question that arises is why do Islamist regimes at times pursue accommodative strategies marked by greater toleration and recognition towards their minorities, while at other times practice repressive strategies. The contention presented here is that the Islamists' approach towards minorities is guided by strategic calculus contingent on first, domestic coalition and alliance building, and second, regional and international dynamics (De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003; Magaloni, 2009; Mehler, 2009).