What shapes the geography of protest against single-party authoritarian regimes? Clientelistic theories argue that regimes use employment to co-opt state workers, such that towns with high levels of public employment should feature few anti-government protests. But regimes can also opt for repressive strategies that disincentivize the maintenance or limit the effectiveness of clientelistic distribution. Where distributive mechanisms are frayed, public employees may face more risks from and be more sensitive to regime repression, but otherwise be just as or more likely as their peers to support credible opposition movements. Examining Sunni participation in Syria’s 2011 protests, I find towns with high levels of public employment protest more frequently than comparable towns with low levels of public employment where there is no nearby military installation able to monitor and punish anti-regime behavior. Additional qualitative research and historical data can further explore the mechanisms underpinning this finding. Current results motivate further attention to how state patronage and sub-national variation in repressive capacity generate compliance.