Israel's military conquests in June 1967 provided her with a unique opportunity to resolve the Arab-Zionist conflict by trading land for peace. From the start of the occupation, both King Hussein of Jordan and the West Bank Palestinian leadership communicated their wish to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel. But Israel was unwilling to pay the territorial price for peace. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol repeatedly said that in the war Israel had won a rich dowry of territory, but it came with a bride – the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – "whom we don’t want." Relying on newly declassified records from Israeli, American, British and UN archives, as well as privately-obtained papers, I argue that the Israeli government translated Eshkol's metaphor into a concrete policy that aimed to appropriate the "dowry" and divorce the "bride." Regarding the "dowry," Israel immediately annexed the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, and the cabinet decided to retain the Gaza Strip. While avoiding a formal decision on the fate of the West Bank, Jewish settlement in the occupied territories – including the West Bank – was fostered. As for the unwelcome "bride," some twenty West Bank villages and towns were destroyed, completely or partially, in the wake of the fighting in June, and West Bankers were pushed to flee across the Jordan River; later, tens of thousands of the war refugees were denied return to their homes, and top-secret schemes to encourage Palestinian emigration were implemented. All the while, the United States pressured Israel to negotiate a peace settlement with King Hussein. Washington's position was that Israel should return to the pre-war lines with small, reciprocal modifications. Thus Israel resorted to a double game which meant to mislead the Americans into thinking that Israel was weighing its peace options. While attempting to create the semblance of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank, Israel held secret talks with Hussein. The former track was intended to lead to an Arab civil administration, run by local collaborators and devoid of power. The latter took the form of a show of seeking serious negotiations. Israel offered Jordan a peace plan – the Allon Plan – which it knew to be unacceptable. Its real goal, to keep the futile contacts going and maintain the territorial status quo, was successful. But by adopting a foreign policy of deception, Israel deliberately squandered a real opportunity for a peaceful settlement.