According to some critics, a civil society initiative founded by an Islamic preacher in Turkey named Gulen movement allied with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 to advance its interests at home and abroad. While this alliance created new economic and political opportunities for Turkish involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, the strength of the partnership to create new political opportunities was surprisingly restricted in Central Asia. What explains this divergent performance? This paper shows that an interaction between at least two factors explains this variation: 1) electoral interests of the ruling political party (AKP), and 2) political regime type of target countries. More specifically, the paper argues that while an electoral coalition between a party and a social movement is necessary to reformulate foreign policy priorities, it is not a sufficient condition to explain the divergent performance of this alliance in providing development aid overseas. In fact, the varying political regimes of host countries that interact with AKP and Gulen followers lead to contrasting degrees of Turkish involvement. While personalistic authoritarian regimes with weak institutions welcomed Turkish actors through bilateral agreements in sub-Saharan Africa, their counterparts in Central Asia, often governed by clan-based authoritarian systems that rely on robust coercive institutions, adamantly resisted greater Turkish political involvement pushed through overseas development assistance programs. To develop these points further, the paper is divided into three parts. First, I discuss the strengths and limitations of existing approaches, and show that none of these perspectives is able to explain the variation in Turkish foreign policy across distinct geographic contexts. In order to account for this puzzle, I provide an alternative framework that highlights the role of domestic political dynamics in foreign relations. The following debate lays out the dynamics of an electoral alliance between the AKP and Gulen followers, and highlights the conditions under which AKP politicians resorted to different tactics overseas. The next section builds on this discussion with comparative evidence from Sudan and Kazakhstan, and shows that the political regime of the host country is a critical factor in the ability of the Turkish government to create new spheres of influence. The conclusion puts the findings in perspective, and highlights the implications of Turkey’s new foreign policy agenda in transformation.