According to the supply-side model of religion (Finke and Stark 1988), governmental policies to promote religiosity policies would backfire as politicization of religion brings disenchantment especially among people who oppose the ruling government (Taylor 2007). From an alternative view, ostentatious governmental patronage of religious entities and espousal of religious symbols contribute to greater levels of societal conformism and incentivize people to appear more religious to stay in good graces of political elites (Rubin 2017; Platteau 2017). Finally, both of these hypotheses could be simultaneously true via the mechanism of partisan sorting; religiosity gains an intrinsically partisan meaning and becomes part and parcel of identity politics. (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Contemporary Turkey provides an ideal case study to test these three competing hypotheses. The rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become increasingly authoritarian and polarizing (Çınar 2022; Somer 2022). Espousing a top-down approach of religious-moral configuration of the society, the AKP leadership has made more frequent references to Islamic arguments to justify its policy choices, identified certain types of lifestyles as unIslamic, boosted its financial support to both state and non-state initiatives to embolden the role of Sunni Islam in education system and societal life (Akşit et al. 2012; Tokdoğan 2018; Gençkal Eroler 2019). Relatedly, it instrumentalized Sunni Islam as a way to limit discontent among the Kurds (Türkmen 2020). At the same time, these top-down Islamization attempts tend to backfire leading to greater disbelief and agnosticism in the society (KONDA 2019; Livny 2020). Marshaling a wide variety of empirical sources, we test our hypotheses about the effects of the increasing fusion of religion and politics on popular religiosity. Our sources include a series of nationally representative cross-sectional public opinion surveys from early 2000s to 2020 that enable us conduct cohort analyses, electoral results at the district level, and official statistics about attendance in Quran courses from the last two decades. Our analyses reveal a complicated and dynamic picture. First, religiosity has declined in the post-2013 era, especially among the young who spent their formative years under the AKP regime. Next, consistent with the partisan sorting hypothesis, partisanship and ethnic identity shapes the level of religiosity among older citizens. Finally, similar to long-term trends in other countries such as the U.S., we observe an increasing convergence of nationalism and religiosity in the second decade of the AKP rule.