This paper embeds a textured, ethnographic study of Nahdaoui (Ennahda party supporting) youth – drawing on four years of fieldwork – within a broader analysis of generational tensions in Tunisian politics. Ennahda leaders’ efforts to rethink Islamism as a national, long-termist project of al-siyasa al-intiqaliya (transitional politics) predicated on compromise, cultural conservatism, and the survival of a democratic (if not necessarily secular-liberal) political system, has not translated fully to its base – particularly the young. While middle-aged and older Nahdaouis have experienced difficulty coming to terms with power-sharing political compromises, younger Nahdaouis – whom I define as individuals aged 35 and younger – have had trouble accepting the leadership’s malleable messaging, and most importantly concessions on ‘classically Islamist’ issues, most notably the inclusion of “sharia” in Tunisia’s 2014 constitution. (Ghannouchi famously said that lack of agreement over what sharia means and negative experiences in places like Afghanistan meant that it should not be referenced in the constitution.) This paper examines six interrelated questions. Why have young Nahdaouis been less willing to compromise on religiously oriented issues than their elders? How does Ennahda’s educational program differ from that of other Ikhwani (brotherhood)-oriented Islamist groups? What sorts of young people are more likely to be promoted through Ennahda’s ranks, and why? How much influence do young people wield on Ennahda’s Shura (Consultative) Council and in regional and municipal representative bodies? What steps has Ennahda taken to expand its base of youth support? Are Tunisia’s young Islamists trapped between a gerontocracy led by political “dinosaurs” and the “dragons” of criminality and extremism, or is the reality more nuanced? Answers to these are questions draw on hundreds of interviews conducted with Ennahda members – especially young, local activists – across Tunisia between 2011 to 2016. The second half of the paper explores how these Islamist intra-party patterns map onto broader dynamics of youth religiosity and political participation shared across political parties and even trade unions and civil society organizations. In this section, I explain how a burgeoning Salafi ‘Almi (quietist, predicatory Salafist) trend in the 2000s represented historic competition for Ennahda, with lasting affects on its youth support. Engaging with literature on Islamism, including the Islamist inclusions/exclusion thesis, modernization, and political sociology, the paper explores how centralization, regional marginalization, and gerontocratic hierarchy – dynamics broadly shared across Tunisian parties and civil society organizations – compare in other political and social movements vis-à-vis Ennahda, and why these trends matter for youth inclusion or exclusion.