The uprising that took place in Syria in March 2011 occurred with a troubling absence of a decided tipping majority. In this paper I look at the action and discourse of various opposing factions during the first two years of the Syrian uprising. I utilize framing theory as an analytical tool to examine the Syrian uprising. I argue that Syrian protesters against the existing regime failed to mobilize a tipping majority because they framed their struggle as a Sunni uprising against an Alawite rule, which was perceived by the Alawites and other minorities to be a sectarian retaliation for the violent response of the Syrian regime against the armed insurgency of Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in the 1980s. Besides, by looking at action repertoires, I analyze the various forms of the protesters’ actions – demonstrative, expressive, and conventional- which further helps to illustrate how they framed their struggle as a sectarian, rather than a political, conflict. I argue that the silent majority of the people on the sidelines opted not to join the uprising as they feared sectarian strife and instability, on account of the sectarian discourse used by the protesters and various factions of the opposition.