State authority is defined to a large extent by its monopolization of legitimate violence. But sometimes regimes allow, and even encourage, extremist groups that represent narrow interests to take ownership of the pursuit of state interests. Such behavior resembles ‘Riding the back of the tiger’ (RBT) and is a highly risky strategy that can backfire with grave repercussions. These ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ can gain veto power over regimes’ actions, limiting their freedom to design policies that are responsive to environmental changes and work for the broader good of the country. Regimes find their goals harder to attain, the conflicts they hoped to resolve even more intractable, and international pressures mounting. Moreover, having developed intimate relationship, the non-state actor gradually gains great ability to resist the regime’s efforts to change course and can even target its former patron with lethality and effectiveness. Changes in established social and economic arrangements inside the state, as well as challenges to state identity, are additional possible consequences. To explore the causes of the RBT phenomenon and its dynamic, the proposed paper will examine two cases in which the state of Israel responded in a dissimilar way to ‘tigers’; in one case it confronted the non-state actor head-on, while in the second the government succumbed to it and compromised its own authority. In the first, the Israeli provisional government, insisting on imposing its authority on all Jewish paramilitary groups, confronted the underground ‘Irgun’ group. The conflict between the state and the Irgun peaked with the 1948 ‘Altalena Affair,’ in which the provisional government demanded that the group hand over to the Israel Defense Forces all weapons on board its cargo ship Altalena. When the Irgun sought a compromise and refused a complete surrender to the state’s demands, the government authorized the use of lethal force and sank the boat. By contrast, successive Israeli governments since the 1970s have declined to reaffirm state authority against radical and messianic groups in the West Bank. Both right- and left-wing Israeli governments have pandered to ultra-nationalist settlers despite their subversion of state authority. Israel’s policy has not offered significant strategic benefits and, in fact, has been self-defeating: Rather than ameliorate the Palestinian problem, it has intensified the conflict. In addition, the hands-off policy has weakened Israel’s international standing while deepening domestic divisions that cloud the state’s internal unity.