This paper explores the conceptual puzzles introduced by increased financial openness in contemporary authoritarian regimes, specifically those of the Middle East. It presents theories on the effects of financial flows on elite coalition politics. Since the 1970s cross-national financial flows grew exponentially worldwide. While such increases in international transactions have affected domestic politics in virtually every country, how this occurred has not always been obvious. Indeed, the sheer volume of literature on this topic makes it easy to overlook an important point: Very little of it addresses the effects of international financial integration on authoritarian regimes. In light of the gap between real world phenomena and academic investigation, this paper supplements existing data with case study research on Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt to examine the following questions: How do linkages with global markets affect the sectors, factors, or cleavages that comprise political interaction among ruling elites in an authoritarian regime? What role does international economic integration play in structuring regime-opposition contention? And how, ultimately, is the longevity and solidity of authoritarian governance challenged by market liberalization? In addressing such questions, I seek to account for how economic reforms leading to increased international economic openness have affected elite-level contestation in the MENA region and in authoritarian regimes in general.