State-building in Qatar took place under circumstances that are largely unique in relation to most other parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Bahrain, in Qatar the ruling family, the Al-Thanis, did not have to contend with other groups in their vicinity who had collective identities or corporate interests. In Qatar, lack of easily accessible ports and an underdeveloped pearling industry resulted in the comparative weakness of the merchant classes, and an absence of vibrant urban centers impeded the growth of a robust religious establishment. This left the large Al-Thani clan as the only organized group to vie for power and freed it from the need to offer concessions to other, potentially competing groups. Political competition was thus limited to occurring within the ruling family. The flow of oil revenues further consolidated Al-Thani rule, though it did little to foster cohesion and unity within the family. If anything, internal family competition over political power and influence intensified. Only beginning in the 1990s, with the ascension to power of Hamad bin Khalifa following yet another palace coup, was the internal politics of the Al-Thani family streamlined and were the rules of succession codified. Preoccupation with political consolidation took place at the expense of state-building processes, thus resulting in the absence of many of the institutional accouterments of a modern state. Institutional underdevelopment has been reinforced by the pervasiveness of rent revenues, which have freed the state from the need to give concessions to any potential opposition groups. Over the last decade, the state has undertaken a frantic effort to proliferate much needed institutions for modern governance. But the underlying personalism of the sultanistic system remains intact. While the emerging system of benign despotism has so far not encountered any serious difficulties, its continued viability in the post-oil era, at least in its present form, is open to question.