The rise of Islamic political parties (IPPs) in the aftermath of the Arab Spring raises various questions as to whether IPPs are seeking to establish an Islamic “tyranny of the majority,” or whether they are the equivalents of Christian Democrats committed to democratic principles. At the core of this debate is ambiguity over who IPPs are and what their “Islamic political identity” stands for. Hence, it is important to take a step back and to ask under what conditions and how IPPs define their identity. To begin with, IPPs, while defining their Islamic political identity, face a strategic dilemma between pragmatism and idealism. On the one hand, IPPs are trying to effectively govern a new political system that is subject to polarizations and to political instability. Moreover, they also are trying to establish themselves as trustable partners in international relations who will not repeat the self-imposed international alienation of the Iranian Revolution. In short, they face pragmatic problems within the context of real politics. On the other hand, IPPs, after years of repression, want to realize their ideologically driven goals while avoiding “watering down” their Islamic identity. As a result, Islamic movements today face a strategic dilemma between idealism and pragmatism where they have to find a way to stay true to their ideals as a governing party, while also pursuing popular support and international legitimacy. In order to discuss this strategic dilemma and its effects on Islamic political identity, in this paper, I focus on the Turkish AK Party, an IPP that has governed Turkey since 2002. I am focusing on the Turkish AK Party, because it is the only IPP that has been in government for over a decade and thus it can give us further insight into the future directions of IPPs. By analyzing the three electoral terms the AK Party was in power, I argue that the AK Party used foreign policy activism to solve this strategic dilemma between idealism and pragmatism. In particular, I analyze (1) how the AK Party used its pro-EU stance to cut its ties with its Islamist past and to signal the international community its pro-Western stance, and (2) how it started to get more involved in the Middle East to signal its difference from traditional center-right parties and thus its “hybrid” party identity. My evidence comes from party documents as well as from public opinion surveys.