Why has the party system that emerged following Tunisia’s 2010–11 uprising not featured a starker left-right cleavage, defined in terms of competing orientations to economic development? In this paper, I argue that at least part of the explanation lies in subnational dynamics. In addressing voters in marginalized regions during the 2011, 2014, and 2019 elections, the main parties in the country have offered broadly similar rhetoric regarding social and economic problems. In each of these elections, voters in these regions have chosen alternatives to the main parties at a higher rate than has been the case in wealthy areas. To establish this argument, I draw upon two types of data. First, I analyze a sample of subnational campaign videos broadcast on public television during the official campaign periods in 2011, 2014, and 2019 and establish that a) candidates for the main political parties contesting elections in economically marginalized governorates have indeed dedicated more attention to economic problems than have their peers running in wealthier regions but b) have expressed broadly similar responses to them. Second, I match delegation-level election returns in 2011, 2014, and 2019 to a social and economic development index created using the 2014 census and demonstrate that voters in economically marginalized delegations in each election have voted systematically differently than have those in wealthier regions; they have been significantly less likely to support the mainstream parties in each election. But marginalized delegations have not coordinated around a unified alternative to these mainstream parties. Instead, they have voted at a higher rate than have voters in wealthier regions for a heterogeneous mixture of socially conservative populists such as the Popular Petition in 2011; parties led by plutocratic populists such as the Free Patriotic Union in 2011; Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, and Arab Nationalist parties in each election; and independent lists in each election.