The other papers on this panel look at the production and use of symbolic power at the domestic level. This paper carries this analysis a step further by asking ‘when and how can secondary powers like Turkey exert symbolic power at the regional and international levels and act as agents of regime change and models of democratization?’ Observers have generally seen the absence of an appropriate regional democratic model as a factor discouraging democratization in the Middle East. For a brief moment in 2010-2, however, it was possible to imagine a democratic Middle East based on the 'Turkish Model.' Given Turkey’s historically poor relations with its Arab neighbors, its long history of economic and political instability, and its close ties with the West and Israel, the appeal of the Turkish model to Arab activists needs explanation. I highlight the importance of regional environment in explaining regime transitions and the timing of the Arab uprisings and argue that the promotion of the Turkish model by Arab activists and their Western supporters was due to two factors. First, a more nuanced understanding of political Islam and Islamism encouraged the representation of the mildly-Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) as model Muslim Democrats and increased the hopes for the emergence of similar groups in other countries. Second the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan not only made the success of the Turkish democracy imperative to American democracy promotion in the region but also focused US security interests in the Persian Gulf region. These shifts in perceptions and US/Western interests provided the JDP with the opportunity to both reform Turkey's domestic politics and to re-brand Turkey as an economically prosperous and democratic Muslim country that could maintain close ties with the West while championing the cause of activists against Western supported regimes. This re-branding of Turkey, however, only bore fruit in North Africa where geopolitical shifts over the previous decade had reduced the risks of regime change but not in the Persian Gulf region where stakes remained high and great powers proved more reluctant to risk instability. The paper utilizes public statements by key actors, governmental and think-tank reports, newspapers, and the vast academic literature on the Turkish model and the Arab uprisings.