Many scholars have argued that the failure of Jordan’s Arab Spring democracy movement is due to the lack of cohesion among protestors. In these scholarly accounts, this misfortune stemmed primarily from traditional monarchic legitimacy that diluted big transformative hopes, or simply from the unshakable Jordanian-Palestinian societal rift that divides Jordanian masses into two vertically competing blocks. Others believe that the Muslim Brothers – a major player in the political arena, is relatively weaker in Jordan when compared to its presence elsewhere in the region. Unlike the prevailing view, I show that the democracy movement in Jordan was coherent enough for the state to reckon with for about two years before successfully repressing it by end of 2012. In fact, I show that the Muslim Brothers secured major concessions from the state in that period, such as the return of an exiled leader, and the return of previously confiscated assets. I also show how a successful mass mobilization by public schools teachers that crossed the ethnic division line, won the right to unionize. Building on a political economy model for democratic concessions that is nested in the triangular industrial relations of state, capital, and labor; I argue, alternatively, that it is the lacking of labor disruptive capacity that ailed the democracy movement in Jordan. I show in this paper how the trajectory of Jordanian capitalism installed specific structural impediments to labor organizing in the country, primarily by depending on low-skill and low-pay foreign workers in the strategic sectors for the state. With labor’s inability to put significant pressures on the capitalist class, which in its turn could sway state officials in favor of reform, the democracy movement lost steam with its inability to create major disruptions for the elites. This research builds on economic data analysis, newspaper research, and in-depth interviews between 2013 and 2018 with thirty-two democracy activists, trade unionists, and business and state representatives in Jordan. To support this claim, I compare the failure in Jordan with the only lasting successes of the Arab Spring, in Morocco and Tunisia, where labor organizations led and protected the protests on their way to gain major democratic concessions in 2011.