This paper examines the evolution of privileged elite lobbying groups in the Jordanian water sector and contributes to the body of empirical research authoritarian politics. Contending with the pressures of explosive population growth, refugee influx, and a natural dearth of water, Jordan is among the most water scarce countries in the world. The persistence of elite dominance in the sector through such practices as water theft and nepotistic behavior in a sector widely-acknowledged to be critical for economic development is therefore puzzling, particularly given the current monarch’s public commitment to Jordanian reform. Combining archival research with elite interviews, this study employs new institutional and public choice theories to construct an empirical account of the processes that shaped contemporary sectoral dynamics. Our findings indicate that the sector has experienced sustained internal conflict in attempting to accommodate increased municipal demands while being subordinate to elite interests. Structural and political constraints tied to landownership, elite identity and distributional conflict limit the regime’s ability to manage water resources effectively. This case provides an inroad to refining theories of public choice and resource conflict in authoritarian contexts.