While corruption exists in all political systems, it flourishes in authoritarian states given the absence of transparency and the predatory nature of rulers. In Jordan, for instance, bribery, graft, extortion, and embezzlement and other acts of malfeasance have typified the political economy of neoliberalism under King Abdullah. Yet, like many other authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and beyond, the Jordanian regime has also pledged to prosecute these alleged crimes by creating an official anti-corruption agency, and periodically imprisoning various elites caught in corrupt acts. Herein lies the puzzle. In the Hashemite Kingdom, powerholders cannot ignore corruption completely, because such neglect inflames a Jordanian public capable of mobilizing anti-regime opposition and mass protests. However, clamping down wholesale upon corruption also risks alienating the ruling political and business class, which represents a core constituency for the regime. What, then, determines “how much” an autocracy like Jordan cracks down upon corruption, and who it targets? Drawing upon new corruption-related records culled from Jordanian judicial reports, donor white papers, and third party monitoring since 2009, our paper provides an innovative answer. The politics of anti-corruption campaigns revolves around three interrelated goals. First, aid-dependent states like Jordan must respond to demands from donors, such as the US and World Bank, to clean up their politics. Those demands do not stipulate democratization or major political changes—only marginal legal reforms designed to beautify the image of those donors. Second, the Jordanian leadership frequently times anti-corruption initiatives, such as jailing high-ranking officials or empowering its anti-corruption agency, to placate popular protests. This tactic entails finding sacrificial lambs in contingent moments of crisis to swing public opinion towards the palace. Third, the regime periodically purges its own ranks in order to eliminate ambitious elites whose influence threatens the king himself, regardless of either international pressure or public opinion. Past directors of the mukhabarat, for example, as well as former royal court officials have been ensnared in this way. We find that the vast majority of all corruption-related prosecutions in Jordan reflect these three goals, and not the putative objective of improving the quality of governance or strengthening the rule of law. Hence, anti-corruption crackdowns are neither meaningless political charades nor meaningful advances towards democracy: they are eclectic strategies aimed at pleasing multiple audiences while pruning the hedges of a ruling coalition.