Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have competed for influence across the Middle East, and they have been especially active amid and after the Arab Spring. Myriad monographs have explored the economic, political, and security policies of Qatar (Kamrava 2013 and Ulrichsen 2020) and the UAE (Almezaini 2012 and Esfandiary 2023). Countless chapters have used the duo as a paired comparison (Soubrier 2017 and Mason 2020). These works provide invaluable insights on Qatari and Emirati foreign policy. But a gap persists in the literature in explaining these states’ respective partnerships with their shared security guarantor: the United States (U.S.). Why have Qatar and the UAE differed in their support to the same U.S. foreign policy plans? For instance, why did the UAE fully support the Abraham Accords in 2020, whereas Qatar opposed them? Or, why did Qatar first facilitate transit for Afghans from Kabul in mid-August 2021, whereas the UAE gave lower levels of assistance a week later? I argue that variations in support result from differences in their status-seeking motivations. I develop the theory “deferential status competition,” which hypothesizes that relatively more assured and satisfied smaller partners are more likely to support a larger partner’s plans in order to accrue reputational recognition and reward. Alternatively, more apprehensive or frustrated smaller partners are less like to provide support. I test my theory against two alternatives: an argument related to variations in larger partner pressure and an argument related to variations in intra-GCC societal preferences. My methodology involves a paired comparison of the material and rhetorical support that Qatar and the UAE have granted to or withheld from select U.S. foreign policy plans. Data include primary-source governmental statements, secondary-source analyzes, and responses from dozens of interviews with U.S.- and GCC-based academics and diplomats. My results reveal that Qatar and the UAE decide to support U.S. policies when doing so provides a status advantage over their peer. Qatar has been content with the U.S., a sentiment that has produced a supportive posture during the last half-decade. The UAE is highly aggrieved with a U.S. it sees as dismissive and departing, and has conditioned its support accordingly as it seeks great power alternatives. The main implication of my paper is that smaller partners have greater agency in their asymmetric alliances than foundational theories of international politics afford. Also, my paper adds empirical clarity and theoretical richness to the study of U.S.-GCC relations.