The IMF’s history with most countries in the MENA region is well established and much studied, as the IMF has been instrumental in sponsoring structural adjustment programs in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia since the 1980s. Its interaction with Iraq is more recent and less well studied. With Iraq at war or sanctioned, the IMF had no contact with the country from 1983 to 2003. The IMF’s re-engagement with Iraq takes place in the context of US occupation in 2003 and as the Iraqi economy is recovering from decades of war and sanctions. What is more, unlike its prior encounters with MENA countries, the IMF’s re-engagement with Iraq in 2003 occurs in a period when the IMF is reassessing its own doctrine and methods, placing more emphasis on the provision of social welfare and even raising concerns about rising inequality. In an effort to enlarge our understanding of the IMF’s involvement with MENA countries, this paper will examine Iraq’s relationship with the IMF since 2003, using IMF article IV consultations with Iraq, IMF country reports, as well as secondary sources. I will show, first, that the IMF’s influence over public policy in Iraq has been modest and declining over time. Because of Iraq’s vast oil wealth, the IMF has been unable to dictate terms as elsewhere; its influence declines with the completion of Iraq’s (IMF managed) debt write-off and follows rising oil revenues. From failure to heed IMF advice to reform Iraq’s public distribution (rations) system and hydrocarbon law, to unwillingness to abide by IMF dictates on budget apportionments for the Kurdistan Regional Government, strategic interests and popular agitation have typically stymied IMF influence. Second, I argue that the evidence suggests that the IMF, in general, has shown some realism and understanding of Iraq’s economic conditions, arguing for the protection of social spending and for the protection of the poor, which stands in sharp contrast to the market fundamentalism of the occupying US administration. Finally, I argue that despite the IMF’s changing doctrine, its tools remain rooted in the past, pointing to clear inconsistencies in IMF policy and practice. This research fills a gap in our understanding of IMF policies in MENA. It equally contributes to ongoing discussions and policy work concerning recovery and rebuilding in post-conflict countries (in MENA and elsewhere).