In the post-colonial Egyptian state, the army decided to intervene and take down existing regimes three times: once in 1952, and twice more recently in 2011 and 2013. In old and new cases of intervention, the Egyptian military institution deployed the same nationalist rhetoric about its duty as the “guardian” of the nation and the protector of national unity and security. However, the new army of the last three years is not the same institution that existed sixty years ago. Investigating the recent history of the Egyptian army from 1980s till 2014, this paper argues that a new military institution was born in the country from 1981 onwards—after Egypt fought its last war with its traditional enemy and signed a peace treaty. It is an army of “neo-liberal officers,” who run vast business enterprises, enjoy financial autonomy beyond public scrutiny, heavily penetrate into social realms, and intervene in politics for reasons different than those of the old army—albeit by using the same populist rhetoric. It is an army that has militarized the nation through perpetuated nationalistic myths and ever expanding economic hegemony. Applying political economy and post-colonial theoretical approaches and drawing from comparative literature on other global and Middle Eastern militaries, the paper argues that a fundamental rupture took place in the history of the Egyptian army in the 1980s. Whereas the old army was composed of low- to middle-class soldiers who militarized society through wars and socialism, the new army is controlled by a class of military business managers and militarizes society through economic dominance. This group of “neo-liberal officers” does not believe in the dicta of the market economy, but took advantage of Mubarak’s neo-liberal transitions to create links with regional and global capital, and expanded social control over low- and middle class consumers and the collaborating local business elite. Between 2011 and 2014, this army has forged new alliances with old leftist forces internally, and consolidated its ties with regional and global capital externally towards prolonged dominance—with or without winning the presidential seat. The paper relies on a variety of Arabic and English primary sources, including military companies’ profiles, laws and decrees, government budget files, court cases, parliamentary minutes, interviews with officers and conscripts, newspapers, U.S. congressional and NSC archives, movies, songs, museums, social media, etc. (This paper is derived from a book manuscript the author is working on-- contracted by Columbia University Press.)