Tunisia, long perceived as an oasis of moderation in the MENA region, experienced a surge in Salafi mobilization following the 2011 revolution. Many observers have been surprised by the dramatic emergence and ubiquity of Tunisian Salafism, since Salafi trends-- although present in Tunisia since the 1980s-- remained mostly underground before the revolution. Intense media coverage of the "Salafi threat" has placed pressure on policy analysts to rapidly ascertain the movement's composition, often resulting in single-factor, reductionist explanations of Salafis' motivations (such as the assumption that Salafis become Salafis simply because they are poor). Such pressure has resulted in a glut of surface-level misinformation, with comparatively little space left for nuanced analyses based on in-depth field interviews with Salafis themselves. While Tunisia's Salafis share certain goals, they are diverse and largely disorganized. This paper shines light on the most salient difference separating Tunisia's Salafi trends-- the matter of age and generational politics. While Tunisia's older Salafis have tended to identify with more traditional forms of quietist practice ("jihad of the heart") or have waded gingerly into the realm of party politics, Tunisia's young people-- who comprise the fastest-growing demographic of self-described Salafis-- identify heavily with the Salafi jihadi movement, which they describe as more assertive and more activism-oriented (jihad al-haraka as opposed to jihad al-qalb). Jihadi Salafis echo Tunisian youths' general frustrations with hypocrisy, heavily centralized state power, and an older generation of political actors perceived as largely incompetent and neglectful. However, they go much farther than their peers by rejecting the party system almost entirely and setting up a religiously informed subculture in its place. From donning atypical, sometimes rebellious forms of religiously conservative dress to propping up new twenty-something "sheikhs" in local mosques, young jihadi Salafis are impacting the social scene and staging their own, more organic forms of transitional justice. They represent an important but misunderstood minority in Tunisian society. This paper is based on nearly two years' worth of ethnographic field interviews with a group of 18 Salafi young people. It emphasizes the alternative lifestyle aspect of jihadi Salafism, and explores the causes for young Salafis' antipathy to party political integration. The paper also focuses on the relationship between young Salafis and Tunisia's much-beleaguered security sector, which has been the topic of intense rumour and scrutiny over the past two years.