There are at least three distinctive types of Islamism that coexist today, and each individual may subscribe to different types in different domains at different times. To use a familiar example, numerous Muslims may exhibit a form of pietism by accepting traditional views on female “dress codes” while being progressive/modern in their views on financial transactions and oppose political Islam. Likewise, many “Islamic finance” professionals benefit as parasitic-Islamists (meant in a strictly non-pejorative sense) from the rents accrued from reengineering financial contracts to adhere to traditional jurisprudence in a manner that allays the religious anxieties of pietist-Islamist customers and/or serves the economic and political empowerment agendas of political Islamists. Unfortunately, survey questionnaires always conflate all three types of Islamism. For example, the Arab Barometer question on whether banks should be forbidden from charging interest may elicit affirmative responses driven by the pietist needs of the voluntarily financially disintermediated, the professional ambitions of current or potential “Islamic finance” professionals, or the political goals of Islamists who desire to use “applying Shari`a” as a power vehicle. Likewise, questions on “applying Shari`a,” which we can find in World Values Survey, Pew, and other surveys, conflate the three potential motives, which may coexist or diverge for any given respondent. Thus, direct regression analysis using such survey data requires indefensibly unreasonable assumptions about the specific aspects salient in respondents’ minds, and their uniformity across respondents. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of useful information that can be gleaned from such data, and so-called “Islamic finance” remains one of the best examples of the way Islamist forces of the various pietist, parasitic, and political types negotiate the reconciliation of pseudo-traditional Islamic identity with modernity. (The other obvious examples, which have been studied much more extensively, have been ``hijab’’ as a dress code for women, and to a lesser extent facial hair and forehead ``prayer marks’’ for men, among other physical signals of religious identity and intensity that vary in cost, provision of business opportunities, and leverage of religious identity politics.) In this paper, I propose using a hybrid of three methods: (1) economic analysis of the methods of Islamic finance, (2) summarization of anecdotal evidence based on writings of industry participants, and (3) cross-tabulation of opinion surveys to construct mental mappings of the different combinations of Islamist mindsets and their correlations with economic and political attitudes (with special focus on attitudes toward income pre- and re-distribution).