From traditional Marxian and Weberian concepts to the post-Marxist French school of thought, especially Foucault and Bourdieu, numerous developments and shifts have happened within the sociology of intellectuals. “Cultural field of production”, “new epistemic communities”, “decline of the public intellectuals”, and so forth have been coined as new notions and concepts. Most of the studies on post-revolutionary Iran, especially on intellectual climate of the country, have concentrated on the religious reform, religious intellectuals, and their contenders. However, as time passed the Islamic Republic of Iran’s socio-political structure as well as its intellectual milieu have become rather complex, diversified, and nuanced. Based on the qualitative content analysis method and the new theoretical developments within the new sociology of intellectuals, this article argues about the latest intellectual communities’ developments, especially in the post Reform Movement Iran. The hegemonic impact of religious intellectuals from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s gradually waned, and new intellectual communities as well as different layers of neo-leftist (Farhadpour, Rokhdad Project, and so forth), Persianate/nationalist (Tabatabae), spiritualist (Malekian), economically oriented (Renani, Maljoo, and Ghaninejad) intellectuals, as well as Musavi’s circle (Institute for Religion and Economy) emerged within the country. This article argues that in addition to the religious, secular, nationalist, and leftist intellectuals including public or academic ones in opposition side of the political and intellectual spectrum, the political establishment to some extent has been able to produce its own intellectuals (i.e., Afroogh, Kachooyan). Moreover, another shift within the political establishment can be adduced; congruous to the increasing complexities of the I. R. of Iran in its totality, other attached scholars to the political establishment have experienced new transitioning intellectual horizons (i.e., Jafarian). Surprisingly enough, and in contrast to the gradual centralization of the political establishment and opposition including some public/activist intellectuals (i.e., Hajjarian) within the country, radicalization of the different layers of public intellectuals could be traced. Religious iconic intellectuals, especially the second generation which sometimes referred to as the founding fathers of the Reform Movement, as well as staunch critics of religious intellectuals, mainly neo-leftist ones, and other public intellectuals (i.e., Ghaderi) have been radicalized.