Do electoral quotas affect the way in which politicians campaign and serve their constituents? A large and growing literature on public goods provision suggests that institutions, even in semi-democracies, can affect politicians’ incentives on what kinds of services to provide and to whom. This paper examines the question in the context of Jordan, where competitive legislative elections have been held since 1989, where gender and minority (Chechen, Circassian) quotas have been introduced, and where the prevailing view is that a politicians’ main job is to provide access to patronage and services. Using detailed quantitative data and extensive interviews, the paper argues that quotas do affect politicians’ campaign and service strategies through their effect on the size and nature of the constituency. Politicians running on a quota are much more likely to be engaged in private charitable and income-generating organizations for campaigning and distributing goods and services to constituents, and to serve a smaller group of voters than the non-quota candidates. I also compare the different effects of the gender and minority quotas.