Syrians who took to the streets in March of 2011 were not driven by sectarianism. They were driven by a desire to assert themselves as citizens of the state and acquire the rights that decades of authoritarian rule had denied to them. However, as the conflict morphed from a peaceful uprising to a violent civil war, sectarian identities became increasingly mobilized and solidified. Much of the scholarly literature has implicitly—and in some cases explicitly—emphasized Syria’s heterogeneous society as a factor conducive to the emergence of a protracted civil war along sectarian lines. However, identity cleavages do not exist in a vacuum, but in relation to broader structural, political, and economic dynamics. This is particularly true in a country like Syria, where ethno-sectarian boundaries often overlap with the geographic map of poverty, marginalization, and displacement. This paper explores the main drivers behind the solidification of sectarian identities in Syria. It focuses, primarily, on the instrumentalization of pre-ascribed identities in the context of an institutionally weak state experiencing drastic sociopolitical change. The main argument put forth is that pre-existing sectarian cleavages are given meaning and become activated in a particular context and, oftentimes, for a clear political purpose. By conceptualizing sectarianism as a result, rather than a cause of conflict, this study highlights the various processes behind community disintegration in Syria. To illustrate this argument, I rely on a combination of process tracing and constructivist analysis of regime discourse. I focus specifically on the Assad regime’s tactics to weaken the opposition, which, as I demonstrate, succeeded in dividing the population (both physically and ideologically) along ethnic lines. I find that, rather than an inevitable outcome of war, sectarian violence and forced displacement are a central strategy of war, particularly in the context of a weak state.