This paper questions the claims that the Qur’ān prohibits the marriage between Muslim women and men from the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb). It argues that the assumed prohibition is a result of patriarchal readings of the Qur’ān by male Muslim exegetes. It also suggests that perpetuation of these unequal rulings between men and women comes from the works of tafsīr and fiqh, and not from the Qur’ān itself, or even the Sunnah. The paper begins by reassessing classical and contemporary authoritative Sunni tafsīrs by focusing on Qur’ān 2:221 and 5:5 that are used as the basis for the rulings of marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims—i.e., the exegetes’ understandings of key Qur’ānic terminology in these two verses. These terms are al-mushrikīn (literally those who attribute peers to God), yu’minū (to believe), Ahl al-Kitāb, and al-kuffār (the unbelievers). The paper then shows how the Qur’ānic text could offer a different understanding if the exegete’s perspective were to change. The paper concludes that the absence of female voice in the process of interpreting the Qur’ān has had a great influence on the rulings related to women. The commentaries on the two verses discussed in the paper show that the male exegetes, who entirely monopolized the process of scriptural interpretation, did not treat men and women’s issues equally. While they attempted to discuss the different possibilities of interpreting a word or part of a verse that could open the door for more male freedom, no such attempt is made when discussing women’s issues. Unfortunately, this unequal treatment of the Qur’anic texts has resulted in a unique consensus on legal rulings pertaining to women. The paper demonstrates that the consensus formed is based on interpretations colored by the patriarchal, misogynistic and imperial impulses of the exegetes. Ever since the recognition of ijmā‘ as a source of legislation, these rulings have been accepted as normative until the present day. Additionally, the paper highlights the possibilities that one could, while relying on the same materials used by earlier exegetes, even using the same methodology, reach conclusions very different from the accepted ijmā‘. This could be possible even without resorting to twentieth-century approaches of interpretation if only we begin to treat men and women’s issues equally. The paper therefore questions the validity of precedents set by ijmā‘ and makes a case for reevaluation of this critical issue.