Relations between monarchical regimes in the Gulf and their Shia citizens, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, have soured to levels as bad as after the Iranian revolution in 1979, when they were seen as an Iranian fifth column. In reaction to the popular uprising in Bahrain in February and March 2011, the Bahraini regime and its regional allies unleashed military force, symbolised by the Saudi and GCC intervention in Bahrain in mid-March 2011, as well as by a media campaign that spread throughout the GCC countries warning citizens of the "sectarian" Shia protesters and the dangers they pose to the "nation". The "Shia threat" has again become the catchall answer to demands for democratic reform and accountability in the Gulf. As a result, sectarian relations within the Arab Gulf countries, as well as with Iran and the Shia-led government of Iraq, have reached a new low point. Small steps that have led to 'marginal recognition' of Saudi Shia after a deal with King Fahd in 1993, for example, have been reversed and sectarianism is the new old reality of domestic politics and international relations in the Gulf. Hence, regime responses in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have created a Sectarian Gulf, that has shaped the political landscape in other Gulf states like Kuwait, and has influenced how the Gulf states reacted to the Arab Uprisings abroad. For now, the Gulf monarchies have weathered the first storm of the Arab Uprisings through a mix of repression, handouts of wealth, and the creation of the Sectarian Gulf. The rhetoric of the Sectarian Gulf has given newfound powers and opportunities to sectarian identity entrepreneurs, people, whose political, social and economic standing depends on the skillful manipulation of sectarian boundaries and who profit if these boundaries become the defining markers of a particular segment of society. This paper is based on several fieldwork trips to all the six GCC member states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar and Oman) between 2011 and 2013. It draws upon interviews with youth activists, key opposition figures, government representatives and diplomats, as well as a close reading of the online discussions surrounding the protests in the Gulf states.