What future challenges does the most important actor of political Islam in Tunisia, Ennahda, face from inside and outside? Based on this question, this paper examines in two analytical sections how the monopolisation of power by Tunisian President Kais Saied affects Ennahda's forward-looking strategies and behaviour. It can already be observed that the state of emergency policy initiated with Said's seizure of power on 25 June 2021 has created the framework for existential uncertainties for the former political heavyweight in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Against this background, the paper first takes a look back at the path that Kais Saied has taken vis-à-vis Ennahda since 2021. Firstly, Saied's approach to the control and and the containement of political Islam at the expense of political power sharing in Tunisia is the focus of a document-based discourse analysis. It is shown that Saied's political break with Tunisia's previous political system goes hand in hand with the disempowerment of the party (elites) established since the so-called Arab Spring, whose most prominent representative has been Ennahda (Camau, 2023; Dihstelhoff, 2023; Gobe, 2022a/b). Secondly, with the help of content-analytical evaluations of interviews with representatives of the Nahda Party, the paper also focuses on the organisation’s own ideas for a way out of the current re-authoritarianisation in Tunisia. Ennahda’s central minimum requirement in this context seems to be a formal return to legitimate participation in rule-of-law structures (cf. Brésillion, 2021; Mersch, 2021; Yerkes, 2022). But what specific solutions does Ennahda offer for the contemporary problems of Tunisia's ongoing multiple state crisis? How likely is it that Ennahda will still pursue a state-centred approach to reform in the future, despite regime repression? Will the organisation be able to renew itself and resume the role it has played since 2011? Does it still have something to offer Tunisians in one form or another?