This paper analyzes transformations in Palestinian identities in exile, specifically in Chicago, in response to the weakening of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the emergence of Islamic reformist structures since the late 1980s. At approximately 85,000 strong, Palestinian Chicago constitutes one of the largest concentrations of Palestinians in North America (Cainkar 1988 and 2009). Prior to the 1980s, secular community organizations that aligned with the PLO factions and with politically left and pan-Arab nationalist currents constituted the political and ideological center of Palestinian Chicago. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a discernible religious shift began to take place. Halal stores, increased attendance at Friday prayers, sartorial changes (men cultivated beards, women began wearing the hijab), and the closing of the secular community centers signaled the change. Several other factors contributed to this transformation: the fracturing of the Palestinian movement with the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) during the first Intifada (1987-1993); the Oslo Peace Process (1993-present) and the consequent diminishing of the PLO with the formation of the Palestinian National Authority; the post-September 11 backlash that emphasized “Islam” as the primary identity category for Muslim immigrants in the United States; and the formation of well-endowed Islamic organizations such as the Mosque Foundation, which replaced the secular-nationalist community centers in the suburban enclaves to which Palestinians had begun to move. The paper—based on NEH-supported fieldwork (2010-2015); more than 80 in-depth interviews; relationships with community leaders dating to the early 1990s; and extensive prior research in the Occupied Territories— makes three claims. First, secularism despite weakening has not disappeared in the Chicago community. Rather, younger activists expressing secularist orientations remain active within different spaces. They have had to respond, however, to the new Islamic institutions and the spread of piety. In doing so, they have accommodated the new religiosity, altering the meaning of secularism in the process. Second, secularism’s continuing vitality shapes the new Islamic orientations, particularly in groups like American Muslims for Palestine, which articulate a type of sacralized nationalism. Finally, new secularisms have emerged from within the Islamic reformist milieu itself. Hybrid in character, they constitute rebellions against the piety-minded milieu. Fieldwork examples illustrate these findings. The paper concludes that the complexity of secularism and religion as sources of identity among Palestinians in the diaspora must force a reevaluation of what secularity and religiosity mean in discussions of Palestinian identity dynamics today.