Tunisia's current economic situation traces its origins back to the political and economic crisis of the 1980s which led to a change in political leadership in Carthage as well as an economic policy shift toward radical (albeit gradual) economic liberalization. Despite very satisfactory results by International Financial Institutions (IFI)-mandated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)-standards, Tunisia's unemployment record remains alarmingly high. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the performance of the so-called 'Solidarity Network' that was introduced by the government to help cope with unemployment and socio-economic exclusion in a manner deemed consistent with the overarching SAP agenda. A Polanyi-type analysis is developed to examine the rise of the Solidarity Network. It will be argued that, unlike Polanyi's concept of the double movement consisting of a liberalization phase followed by a natural reaction against free markets, in the case of Tunisia's experience with SAP, the Solidarity Network did not emerge naturally, but rather was pre-emptively planned and introduced by the government as a preventive measure against potential social opposition to free market policies. The paper argues that the switch to a neoliberal development strategy forced the government to create a socio-economic safety net in order to prevent a social uprising like the one experienced in the 1980s. The Solidarity Network allowed the government to hit two birds with one stone. First, it allowed the government to fight extreme poverty and social exclusion, and second, it was done through fashionable pro-market strategies that enhance entrepreneurial activities. Finally, the paper argues that despite its moderate success in achieving social and political stability, the Solidarity Network remains a weak strategy for fighting unemployment and fostering equitable economic development.