Arab League summits have functioned as the defining institutional forum for inter-Arab politics since the 1960s. Few studies, however, have investigated the processes of political maneuvering and negotiation that occurred behind the scenes at these summits. This gap presents a challenge in assessing the extent to which summits have succeeded in their goals of mediating rivalries and fostering inter-Arab cooperation. This paper investigates the negotiations behind the October 1974 Rabat Conference as a case study in the competing roles of state interests versus claims of legitimacy in a critical Arab summit. The Rabat Summit marked an inflection point in the Arab-Israeli conflict by recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thus foreclosing the possibility of Jordan negotiating with Israel over the future of the West Bank. By examining the political maneuvers of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat before and during the Rabat Summit, the paper argues that Sadat cynically clothed the pursuit of Egyptian state interests at the summit in the language of Palestinian rights and Arab unity. Sadat embraced the recognition of the PLO as a tactical maneuver, to prevent either Jordan or Syria from presenting a viable alternative to continued Egyptian dominance over the course of the Arab-Israeli peace process. By foreclosing Henry Kissinger’s preferred “Jordan Option” for the West Bank, Sadat ensured that Kissinger depended on Egypt as his sole Arab partner. Sadat also used the Rabat Conference to begin Ba’thist Iraq’s reintegration into the mainstream of Arab politics. While Sadat couched this move in the language of Arab unity, the paper examines how Sadat facilitated Iraq’s reintegration primarily to weaken his rival, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. The inner-workings of Arab summits are understudied in part because of the lack of open diplomatic archives in Arab states. In the case of the Rabat Conference, however, a rich collection of declassified US government documents, including records of meetings with Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi, and Moroccan leaders, allows a reconstruction of its diplomacy and politics. The paper combines these US sources with Jordanian, Egyptian, and Palestinian memoirs and publications. Although Sadat and other Arab leaders believed they could reverse the Rabat decision on the PLO if it served their interests, the decision proved impossible to retract. Arab regimes limited their subsequent flexibility when they employed summits as a means to outmaneuver their rivals, as summit decisions took on a life and legitimacy of their own.