The revolutionary forces that overthrew Qaddafi were a motley alliance of long-time opponents to the regime with ordinary citizens, and early defectors from the regime. Within the National Transitional Council and the transitional institutions subsequently created, a new political elite has therefore emerged that mixed together old and new actors alike, from various backgrounds. A fierce struggle has rapidly engaged among them for the control of the centers of power represented by the newly created institutions (especially the Government and the General National Congress). In that struggle, the passing of the Political Exclusion Law constituted a turning point that highlighted the rift between those who claimed to be “genuine revolutionaries” and those who had once collaborated with the former regime. Yet the competition between these included elites eager to take control of the transitional institutions should not obfuscate the fact that these have often not proved a sufficient tool for them to assert their authority. Furthermore, they have on many occasions either been challenged by or had to ask for support from outside elites, i.e. elites which have not been taking part in the new institutional game, or whose role within it has remained ambiguous. This has particularly been the case with local institutions such as the civil and military councils created during the war, whose status and role within the new institutional structure have so far remained unclear. Similarly, while formally kept outside the new institutional order, traditional social structures such as tribal elders councils have often been used and proved crucial to restore peace between conflicting parties at the local level. Also important have been those with the capacity to use force. While weapons have been key to the success of the 2011 uprising, they have remained so in the transitional period, in the hands of gunmen eager to assert their power over networks or territories or as a tool used by political parties to impose their agenda upon decision-makers. Against such background, this paper will analyze the issue of elite change in post-Qaddafi Libya by questioning the very concept of political elites intended as those elites included in the newly created institutions. For a better understanding of the form and scope of political change, attention should also be paid to those outside elites whose influence and power do not derive from their participation in the formal institutional game.