Since 1952, the Egyptian state and the leadership of the Coptic Orthodox clergy have framed and supported the Coptic Orthodox Church as the main political and social representative of the “Coptic community,” while discouraging political leadership independent of the Church. Under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, all political and civil society activism was limited. The national transformation under President Nasser and the administrative transformation within the Coptic Orthodox Church, following 1952, had dramatically curtailed the participation of lay Copts in national politics and in Church reform. As a result of increasing corruption and militarization, social movements began to form in the early 2000s to challenge the Egyptian state, which culminated in the events of 2011. Amidst wider social movements and a broader political opening in Egypt over the past decade, Coptic groups formed to raise awareness of increasing sectarian violence to the wider Egyptian public, to challenge the representative role of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egyptian politics, and to demand legal and social reform around the “Coptic issue.” These groups are indeed something different from what has appeared in the past, particularly their large youth membership. However, it is important to note their small numbers in comparison to the numbers of Coptic youth actively involved in the Church, particularly its Youth Bishopric. The Bishopric is an integral part of the lives of many youth servants of the Church, and since 2011, involvement in the Youth Bishopric has become even more popular with new programming aimed at including national politics within courses on service to the Church. So, even though there are calls from other Coptic youth for a greater political role outside of the representative power of the Church, there are many others who have maintained and strengthened the Church as the central hub of the “Coptic community.” This paper aims to unpack the different contexts that have led to an increase in Coptic mobilization over the past decade, while also investigating how a majority of Coptic youth, despite calls for a greater political role outside of the representative power of the Church, have reinforced the Church as a central leader of social, intellectual and, also, political development, particularly through the activities of the Youth Bishopric. This paper specifically explores the ways in which the Church has adapted to shifting political landscapes since 2011 and has reformulated its programming to shift with emerging political desires among Coptic youth.