In the face of popular challenges, few autocrats rely exclusively, or even principally, on repression to survive. Instead, they exploit a variety of strategies, buying popular support and co-opting elite challengers as necessary. According to existing theory, however, none of these strategies should involve targeted goods to politically disenfranchised minorities or other marginalized groups. Yet in some regimes, we find this very practice, leading us to ask: why provide benefits to the marginalized? In answering this question, I explore the puzzling case of Qatar, where the regime regularly targets distributive goods to otherwise marginalized groups. Such targeting is simply inexplicable for existing theories of authoritarianism. To explain this behavior, I offer a theory of authoritarian co-optation under the threat of economic sabotage. Even groups marginalized from traditional venues of power can influence authoritarian rule by threatening to destroy capital or undermine its growth. The theory predicts the conditions under which autocrats use distributive benefits to prevent sabotage and defuse popular challenges. In testing my theory, I draw on a unique GIS dataset from Qatar. My empirical strategy exploits the spatial segregation of groups to evaluate the relationship between distributive targeting and the location of marginalized communities. Qatar’s regime utilizes GIS data and other technologies in their spatial planning and housing policy. These technologies reinforce and facilitate selective repression and distributive targeting. Ultimately, I show how the Qatari regime provides distinct distributive goods to different communities, favoring citizens over non-citizens and potential saboteurs over groups without a credible sabotage threat.